Yearly Archives: 2009

S.D/L. Perseverance LH2

Wooden Drifter/Liner

Technical

Official Number: 91086
Completed: 1886
Gross Tonnage: 48
Net Tonnage: 20
Length: 67.5 ft
Breadth: 17.6 ft
Depth: 7.4 ft
Engine: C.2-cyl by John Cran & Co, Leith
Built: J. MacKenzie & Co, Leith

History

1886: Completed by J. MacKenzie & Co, Leith (Yd.No.?) for James Wilcock, Manchester (managing owner) as PERSEVERANCE. Registered at Leith (LH2).
1887: Attempted to trawl fish out of Fleetwood, but harassed by smacksmen, their agents and those involved in the inshore fishery and abandoned the venture.
15.8.1889: In collision with The Tyne Improvement Commissioners steam hopper, R.T.C. Hopper No.11 (329grt/1888) in River Tyne sustaining considerable damage to stem and bow planking.
1913: Sold to James Pitchers Jnr, Gt Yarmouth (managing owner).
10.1916: Leith registry closed.
17.10.1916: Registered at Yarmouth (YH429).
15.3.1920: Sold to Thomas Bradley, Gt Yarmouth (managing owner).
1928: Sold for breaking up.
27.1.1928: Yarmouth registry closed “Broken up”.

Click to enlarge image

S.D/L. Perseverance YH429

S.D/L. Perseverance YH429
Picture from the Internet

Changelog

03/01/2009: Page published. 3 updates since then.
06/05/2018: Removed FMHT watermark from image.

S.T. Penguin LO97

Additional information courtesy of Gary Hicks Plymouth Merchant Ships

Technical

Official Number: 114622
Yard Number: 398
Completed: 1902
Gross Tonnage: 190.2
Net Tonnage: 57.87
Length: 112.4 ft
Breadth: 21.1 ft
Depth: 11.6 ft
Built: A. Hall & Co Ltd, Aberdeen
Engine: 420ihp T.3-cyl and boiler by Alex Hall & Co Ltd, Aberdeen

History

18.10.1902: Launched by A. Hall & Co Ltd, Aberdeen (Yd.No.398) for James Chant (32/64) & Thomas Paddon (32/64), Plymouth as PENGUIN.
11.1902: Completed.
20.11.1902: James Chant designated managing owner.
30.11.1902: Registered at Plymouth (PH178)
16.12.1906: With steam trawler MAGNOLIA (M146) towed disabled steamer IDA ZSCHIMMER (362grt/?) of Rostock from SSW of the Longships to Falmouth arriving at 8.00 p.m.
10.8.1908: Vessel mortgaged (64/64) to Lloyds Bank Ltd, London (A).
26.9.1912: Sold to Chant & Paddon Ltd (64/64), Plymouth.
26.9.1912: James Chant & Herbert William Chant appointed managers.
10.10.1912: Vessel mortgaged (64/64) to Lloyds Bank Ltd, London (B).12.10.1912: Mortgage (A) discharged.
1.1.1914: Tonnage altered to 73.73 net under provision of Merchant Shipping Act 1907.
11.1914: Requisitioned for war service as a minesweeper (1-6pdr) (Ad.No.528).
15.1.1916: Based Milford. On patrol and i.a.w. Standing Orders, steaming without lights. At 6.20 am. off Tuskar Rock, collided with HM Drifter EVERARD (INS30)(Ad.No.2460) which subsequently sank.
17.1.1916: Mortgage (B) discharged.
2.3.1918: Sold to Herbert Ford, Birmingham.
4.3.1918: John Maxwell Jones, Plymouth appointed manager.
4.3.1918: Vessel mortgaged (64/64) to Barclays Bank Ltd, London (C).
By 12.3.1919: Returned to owner at Plymouth.
8.11.1920: Mortgaged (C) discharged.
9.11.1920: Sold to Thomas Davidson, Aberdeen.
6.12.1920: Plymouth registry closed.
6.12.1920: Thomas Davidson designated managing owner.
13.12.1920: Registered at Aberdeen (A154).
7.9.1933: Sold to The Hewett Fishing Co Ltd, London (Robert S. Hewett, manager).
7.9.1933: Arrived Fleetwood from fishing grounds with broken propeller.
5.6.1934: Aberdeen registry closed.
7.6.1934: Registered at London (LO97).
1936: Sold for breaking up.
10.2.1937: London registry closed “Broken up”.

Changelog
03/01/2009: Page published. 4 updates since then.

S.T. Pembroke Castle FD340

Technical

Official Number: 108324
Yard Number: 566
Completed: 1898
Gross Tonnage: 153
Net Tonnage: 48
Length: 105.5 ft
Breadth: 20.8 ft
Depth: 10.9 ft
Engine: T.3-cyl by N.E. Marine Engineering Co Ltd, Sunderland
Built: Edwards Bros, North Shields

History

8.11.1897: Launched by Edwards Bros, North Shields (Yd.No.566) for The Castle Steam Trawlers Ltd, London as PEMBROKE CASTLE.
3.1898: Completed. George H. D. Birt, Milford Haven appointed manager.
30.3.1898: Registered at London (LO165).
8.1906: London registry closed.
13.8.1906: Registered Swansea (SA27).
29.8.1906: Crawford Heron, Swansea appointed manager.
26.7.1907: Sold to William Forbes, Newhaven, Edinburgh (managing owner).
28.7.1907: Mortgaged to North of Scotland Bank, Aberdeen.
6.8.1907: Mortgage transferred to William Rafferty, Glasgow.
8.8.1907: Swansea registry closed.
8.1907: Registered at Granton (GN67).
1912: Sold to George Craig, Aberdeen (managing owner).
1912: Granton registry closed.
13.12.1912: Registered at Aberdeen (A531).
1.1.1914: Tonnage altered to 57.54 net under provision of Merchant Shipping Act 1907.
30.11.1916: Sold to Port St. Mary Fishing & Curing Co Ltd, London (Charles Jeffs, Jnr, Cleveleys, manager).
3.1917: At Fleetwood. Fitted with Hotchkiss 6pdr gun (No.2164); complement increased by two gunners.
29.5.1917: Requisitioned for Fishery Reserve.
1919: Released.
1.8.1919: Aberdeen registry closed.
5.8.1919: Registered at Fleetwood (FD340).
11.1919: Landed at Milford having broken down on the fishing grounds.
11.1926: Sold for breaking up.
26.11.1926: Fleetwood registry closed “except so far as relates to mortgage”. Advice received from beneficial owner.

Click to enlarge image

S.T. Pembroke Castle A531

S.T. Pembroke Castle A531and Valkyrien Danmark on the slip.
Picture courtesy of Simon Price

Changelog
03/01/2009: Page published. 3 updates since then.
10/04/2020: Added an image and updated history.

Industrial Fishing

Industrial Fishing

INDUSTRIAL FISHING is the operation of fishing vessels on bulk catching of shoal fish for the fish meal or oil reduction plant. It is undertaken off the coasts of many nations on fish stocks that are of little or no use for human consumption. Peru and South Africa spring readily to mind here as do Norway and Iceland in more recent times.

Now efforts are being made to try and promote this type of fishery from Great Britain. In the main the instigations are coming from scientists or economists, mostly in Government service and who see the growth of an important industrial fishery in Britain as a valuable asset to our economic structure in that we might well be able to reduce our imports of fish meal, which are stated to be worth about £30 million per annum.

This is a good idea in theory and would no doubt be of great benefit to the economy in addition to providing an alternative source of fishing to a section of the fishing community. But the whole idea of an industrial fishery could well work out something quite different in practice and much more thought should be given to the whole idea before a large-scale industrial fishery is begun.

Let us take the facts as they come. Firstly, unlike many of the overseas nations Britain does not have any huge resources of unwanted fish in her coastal waters. Resources, that is, of such an extent as to sustain a continuous exploitation. Apart from the localised and erratic sprat fisheries, about the only shoal fishing left is the herring fishery which is much too valuable an asset to be destroyed in this manner.

An industrial fishery would, therefore, have to be based on the stocks of fish in the far offshore waters where scientists have indicated there are huge stocks of unwanted fish such as the blue whiting and Norway Pout and where foreign vessels have been working for quite some time. This area, to the north of Britain, would seem to be the favourite for a British industrial fishery.

So let us look at this fishing and ask ourselves some simple questions. Who would be the men to fish these stocks; what boats would they use; and where would they dispose of their catches? It would have to be the coastal fishermen who would be persuaded to pursue such a fishery. They are the most adaptable to different types of fishing and many are already experienced in ihe local industrial fisheries around the coasts.

Apart from a handful of boats, however, these fishermen would be unable to work such an offshore fishery. Not counting the long steaming distance and the problems of weather, most vessels would probably find their carrying capacity insufficient to justify such operations. It just would not be economical unless the prices paid were really high. And all the boats would have to be converted to suit them to this type of fishing with the additional safety requirements for industrial bulk fishing.

Most of the fishmeal plants would be too small to accommodate such an influx of raw product and those that were would probably be too far away to make it worthwhile. So a new plant would presumably have to be built, or an existing one expanded. Whatever, the case considerable sums of money would be required both at sea and ashore to set up an efficient industrial fishery, quite a lot no doubt from the tax-payer’s pocket.

But there are greater considerations that should be taken into account when this subject is being discussed, apart from the financial side. For instance, how long would an industrial fishery last on these stocks? How long would it be before the boats found the area barren and were forced to look to other grounds or stocks? To be economically feasible alternative stocks would have to be found which could be used to provide a continuity of supply to the reduction plant.

Would these boats then begin to pursue our coastal stocks, including the valuable herring? We all know what the Norwegians and Icelanders did to their herring stocks through industrial fishing. Already Government officials and private business interests have tried to persuade British fishermen to do this. They have and will continue to receive a short and sharp reply. For upon these stocks are to a great extent the livelihood of countless, fishermen. They are not prepared to endanger their own future to satisfy the whims of others whose well-being is totally independent from fishing. If the Government want to spend money on fishing, they say, spend it on some means of conservation of these stocks, not on extermination.

Yet another consideration must be borne in mind. If our coastal stocks are thus exploited, what would be the effect on our other stocks at present fished for human consumption? Have the scientists determined fully what inter-dependence there is between the unwanted stocks and those presently fished for the market and whether there would be any depletion of one if the other were taken away? In other words, before any large-scale industrial fishing is begun the fishermen would want conclusive evidence from the scientists not only of the extent of those stocks available but also of the probable effects of their exploitation on other fisheries.

A few years ago fishermen might well have been persuaded into such operations. Today, however, there is a new class of fisherman emerging, more intelligent and more interested in his job than ever before. He will not be lead by the hand any more but is surely becoming more capable of leading the way himself.

Last year Ireland opened a marvellous new fish meal plant at Mornington on the east coast. This move is regarded as a tragic blunder as the company running it must by now be realising. Its establishment was the result of a very go-ahead firm and a very keen, yet somewhat inexperienced Irish Fisheries Board, combining to bring greater prosperity both to the nation and the fishermen. The siting of the plant on the Irish Sea was the blunder. Apart from a few local boats the plant has done little good to the majority of fishermen working in the Irish Sea. And there just isn’t the amount of fish required available there to supply such a capacity. And Ireland has no boats of sufficient size to allow them to proceed to the North Scottish grounds for these huge stocks that the scientists say are there. The astonishing thing about this venture is that very few fishermen in the Irish Sea were consulted prior to its establishment. Had they been consulted they would have certainly given it a ‘thumbs-down’ sign.

A very similar situation is developing in Britain with government officials and private business interests seeing the economic benefits to be derived from an industrial fishery. But before any moves are made we consider it imperative that all the side-effects of such a fishery are thoroughly considered and the maximum advice sought from the men who have to catch the fish. It is easy to juggle with figures on paper. It is another thing to go out day-after-day looking for and catching the fish. The practical aspects of this type of fishing must be thoroughly taken into account before any moves are made to establish a large-scale industrial fishery.

The majority of fishermen in Britain are against industrial fishing. It is a messy, soul-destroying job which would have to pay remarkably well to compare with fishing for the consumer market. It is more dangerous and as such would be considered last of all. Then there is the fact that those boats employed in such a role would be taken off other fishing for the food market, possibly creating local shortages and resulting in increased imports of fish.

No. The idea of an industrial fishery in Britain might sound good in theory and look good on paper. But when the practical aspects are considered, then we consider it better to leave well alone. There are enough problems facing the fishermen and the industry as it is.

Source: Peter Brady
Commercial Fishing
March 1970

Commercial Fishing

Commercial Fishing
Mr. Edward Heath, Prime Minister of the U.K.

AN OPEN LETTER TO

Gentlemen:
We write this letter to you in serious urgency. It is said that a general agreement as to whether or not our two countries will or will not be accepted into the European Economic Community is to be made by June this year, or thereabouts. By this we assume that the negotiators will have given a general acceptance to the terms offered us by the present members of the EEC, either as they stand now, or with last-minute modifications.

It is with dismay and apprehension that we have witnessed the casual manner in which our governments have treated the question of fisheries in these negotiations. Fishing may only play a small part in our national economies but it does involve the capital investment of many millions of pounds in catching units, harbour facilities, and shore plants in addition to providing a livelihood for tens of thousands of people, not only in the catching side but in many ancillary industries.

At no time in the long history of. fishing in these islands has our industry been in such a high state of efficiency and with such a bright outlook ahead. True, the industry is not as efficient as some of those in the EEC countries, but it is rapildy moving in the right direction. The long toil by the men over the past few years is now beginning to reap dividends.

Yet all this is threatened with extinction by the present Common Fisheries Policy of the EEC. There are many points in this policy that, were they accepted by us, could seriously reverse the fortunes of our fisheries. There is, however, one over-riding point that would without doubt result in the certain collapse of a greater part of our industry.
It is the ruling that all member states of the EEC have an equal right of access to the coastal waters of their partners iii the Community that is causing despair within the industry.

The coastal waters around the European and Scandinavian coasts have for long been among the most productive in the world. But over the years indiscriminate overfishing, the introduction of over-intensive catching methods, and the destruction of immature stocks have resulted in many of these coastal waters becoming barren.

The British Isles has some excellent coastal fishing grounds, and as our fisheries in general have always been behind the continent in efficiency and productivity, our grounds are more or less still quite productive. In fact, for certain species, such as the herring, the coastal waters of the British Isles are now the last stronghold for these stocks. Most are protected from foreign vessels by being within our 12 mile fishing limits. Because of this the Continentals and Scandinavians cannot pursue these stocks with their own catchers so they have to send freighters to buy the fish from British and Irish catchers, in order to fulfil the tremendous demand back home. This is just one species that the highly-efficient vessels from these countries cannot pursue because of the protection of our limits.

Having slaughtered the herring stocks in their own waters, they are now eagerly awaiting the time when they can come inside our limits. They do not hide their eagerness to get us in the EEC for this one reason. But unlike the fishermen of the British Isles, who have in general a healthy regard for the conservation of existing stocks in order to safeguard their future, these continentals do not. We can see ample evidence in the way they have wiped their own coastal stocks out. Now they want to do the same here.

There have been many ‘expert’ views put forward by economists and others on the advantages and disadvantages of our entry into the EEC on the current terms of the Common Fisheries Policy. Almost to a man they have failed to take into account the practical aspects of such a move. Obviously they don’t know what these are. Yet there is no-one within our industry who cannot forsee the result of our exclusive 12 mile fishing zone being taken away or modified.

Various alternatives have been put forward in order to try and get around this obstacle. Certain breeding areas will be protected; differential limit lines in different areas; and the interests of the fishermen will be fully taken into account, etc. etc. Anyone who is involved in the practical side of fishing can see that these would just not be workable and are only political gimmicry.

Source: Peter Brady
Commercial Fishing
30/04/1971